Robert Gates is the secretary of defense who will always be remembered in
the American history as the only man to serve under two different, consecutive
presidents belonging to opposing parties: George W. Bush and Barack Obama. He
and Robert McNamara were the only ones who succeeded to make a difference at
Pentagon in some of the most turbulent times in modern America's history.
His
book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War is a fascinating,
interesting and controversial account of his journey on the Washington corridors
and through global politics, providing an original, unexpected perspective on war
and power, especially as far as the US policy is concerned.
It is also a warning
aimed at those who pursue their own interests instead of the national ones, sometimes
scattered with maddening inconsistencies, and an encouragement for all those
who fall prey to despair at the thought that dedicated leaders, with a sense of
duty and love for the country and the people they serve no longer exist.
The memoirs describe, on one hand, a patrician-statesman, maybe the last of
his kind, driven by a noble inclination towards public service, and, on the
other hand, an intelligence officer with a brilliant career.
He started as a junior
analyst, he was promoted CIA director and he influenced his country's politics
as a state secretary, having developed the power to express and impose his
point of view in discussions discretely. Underneath the diplomat bipartisan
healer with mild manners that everyone saw, the book reveals a volcanic temper,
tormented by contempt, fed up with the reality he was facing and even bored.
While many must have envied Gates for his position and his power, his book
seems aimed at dissuading politicians from ever trying to include him in their administration.
Besides his obvious contempt and protestation towards the American political
class, he confesses that he did not enjoy his political statute (“I did not enjoy
being secretary of defense” – Gates, 2014, pp.197) and is convinced that people
had no idea how much he detested his job (“People have no idea how much I
detest this job” - pp.199).
Maybe the most important part of Duty is the author's criticism
of the two presidents. As far as George W. Bush’s is concerned, his policies are
severely criticized, but his personality, not so much. The president's agenda
on freedom is deemed simplistic, and his goals regarding the war in Afghanistan
are labeled as “embarrassingly ambitious" (pp. 427), given the poor and
delayed results in training the Afghan troops.
The Iraq invasion and the Guantanamo
and Abu Ghraib rendition revelations are believed to have fueled the
anti-American feeling even further (pp. 117). Gates declares himself “stunned”
by the way Bush's administration bungled in the beginning years of the war and
occupation in Iraq (pp. 26).
As far as Obama is concerned, Gates’ criticism is not that clear-cut. The
black president is described as “quite pragmatic on national security” (pp.
226) and more deliberative than Bush, reminding of Lincoln's problem solving
skills (pp.227). He is praised for his courage to go against Bin Laden.
However, his administration is described as "centralized and controlling",
comparable to those of Richard Nixon and of Henry Kissinger (pp. 439). Maybe
the most interesting observation regarding Barack Obama is his lack of trust in
his commanders, especially in Karzai, shared by Gates himself: “We at Defense …contributed
to White House suspicions” (pp. 358).
The two presidents seem to have a lot in common as
well, more than Gates had believed (pp. 441): they felt more comfortable around
friends and close aides and friends, they tried to establish a network of
supporters, allies and friends, they were neither feared nor liked, they reached
out to those in need, especially to the families of the wounded and dead
military, and they detested Congress.
In fact, Gates' own despise for Congress is one of the reason why Republican
legislators rejected his work. He writes that Congress should be contemplated
from a distance, as it is truly ugly from up close (pp. 435). The parochialism
and political bullshit of most legislators outrage him, and the Foreign Affairs
Committee members are “rude, nasty, and stupid” (pp. 79). He also ridicules Joe
Biden, the Vice President, and some NSC younger staff members who challenged the
generals' wisdom, but ends by agreeing that they were right.
Gates' problem
with Biden is the latter's influence on Obama in winding down the war faster,
although, as he himself acknowledges, the president sided with him on almost
all occasions. The author actually approves of Obama's announcement of the 33,000
extra troops surge and of the withdrawal starting in 18 months' time and
praises the president for his courage in making "a decision that was
opposed by his political advisers" (pp. 441).
Gates' relation with Obama was compromised in the spring of 2011, when,
with the approaching midterm elections and under the fiscal pressures, the
defense secretary was asked to reduce the budget with $400 billion within the upcoming
10 years.
He stepped down three months later, after previously announcing his
intentions. Looking back at his career under Obama's administration, the author
acknowledges that he liked most of those he worked with and he was treated even
better than during the previous administration.
He even wonders: “Why did I
feel I was constantly at war with everybody?” (pp. 425), and the only answer
that comes to his mind is that it was all due to the fact that doing anything
notable was so difficult.
It is important to note that Gates managed to surpass all those
difficulties, and he had many notable accomplishments. In the beginning of Obama’s
mandate, his budget ended or severely cut tens of major weapons programs and he
convinced the Congress to approve his decision. He turned the Pentagon
bureaucracy into a more responsive, accountable outfit.
By upending the
promotion board of the Army, he allowed some creative colonels take their
careers to the next level and be advanced generals, and he fought for the
troops as well. Some might not find themselves in his love recitations
for the troops, in his teary recollections of hospital visits or condolence
letters, but it all points that his emotions were genuine.
He obtained a supplement of $16 billion to the defense budget and ensured
the construction and sending to Iraq of thousands of heavily armored MRAP
troop-carriers, despite the service chiefs' objections, thus saving the lives
of thousands of soldiers and Marine officers.
After reading of Walter Reed
hospital horrors, he did not hesitate to fire the army secretary and clean up
the mess, and he fired the general who was the chief of the Air Force staff for
delaying the production and delivery of the reconnaissance drones meant to help
the soldiers identify roadside bombs and the insurgents planting them.
Despite his complaint that getting things done was difficult, Robert Gates succeeded
in becoming maybe the most influential member of Bush and Obama's administrations.
It is true, in his last couple of months as a part of Obama's administration,
he lost the battle for the defense budget and the one regarding the involvement
of the American military forces in the Libyan revolt.
As he himself admits,
although he enjoyed a tough but successful run for four years, the final months
turned out differently (pp. 414). After getting used to win political wars, the
shock of losing a few battles darkened his memories regarding earlier tensions
and conflicts, won or otherwise.
Perhaps he began laying his memories on paper too soon after leaving the
political scene, without giving his bitterness the chance to wear off. It may
have been helpful to wait for a couple more years and gather his thoughts, put
some order into them.
There are several passages that justify this conclusion.
For example, upon describing NSC's meeting to discuss the strategy to adopt in
case Iran is attacked by Israel, Gates relates that the president's way of
closing the meeting put him off.
The president told his closest advisers to
keep in mind that he did not make any decision regarding the two countries, in
case they were going to write their memoirs, and this idea was offending for
the state secretary (296). However, only a couple of years later, he did just
that, and recounted the very same sensitive manners.
However, leaving such small details aside, the memoirs are compelling and
of an undeniable historical value. One cannot deny the consistency and
relevancy of chapters like those covering the statesman's meetings with various
foreign leaders, with Dimitri Medvedev, Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu among
the most important and controversial.
The author also portrays the Arab
uprising internal debates and offers an inside perspective on what was going on
at the White House throughout that period. Thus, we learn that Obama made his
entrance at the White House with some of the worst cards he could have hoped
for, worse than those that other modern era presidents had been dealt.
We also
discover that, despite the general, worldwide shared opinion that America holds
the cards on almost everything going on around the world, the country's
government has a severely limited ability to control events. America's national
and international policy is maybe for the first time laid out and explained to
the common people and thrown in the face of some politicians in a way that took
everyone by surprise.
Overall, with its small faults and gaps, common, probably, to all works of
this kind, sustained by relevant and captivating real life photos that allow
the reader to feel closer to the events and the author, Robert Gates' book
offers a subjective but fair, consistent and enlightening perspective of the
White House mechanisms.
Sensitive information is laid out in an easy to read,
interesting manner, in a convincing and seemingly honest tone, as one would
remember them talking with a friend by the fire, in a cold winter night. Some of
it is supported by strong arguments and evidence (facts confirmed by the media,
official documents, following events, photos), while some is left to the
reader's judgment.
Accurate or distorted, well supported or merely stated, all of this information put together already
made and will continue to make an interesting reading for thousands of people
around the world. While the average readers will find it captivating, the political class is
sure to react to it in various manners (it already has).
Some will admire and
congratulate Gates for keeping his spine along the years he spent under the two
different administrations and for his courage of coming out and laying his
story out in the open.
Others will envy him for being able to let out his anger
and frustration and take attitude against events and actions they condemned
themselves, but never dared do anything about.
Finally, some will condemn him
and accuse him of falseness and subjectivism, will try to defame him and deny
his merits.
Even so, the simple ability to stir so many and varied reactions
speak highly of Robert Gates' influence and talent at captivating a wide
audience and making his voice heard.
References
Gates, R. (2014). Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at
War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Available from http://tokhi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Gates_Robert_M-Duty__Memoirs_of_a_Secretary_at_War.pdf
