Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War

Robert Gates is the secretary of defense who will always be remembered in the American history as the only man to serve under two different, consecutive presidents belonging to opposing parties: George W. Bush and Barack Obama. He and Robert McNamara were the only ones who succeeded to make a difference at Pentagon in some of the most turbulent times in modern America's history. 

His book, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War is a fascinating, interesting and controversial account of his journey on the Washington corridors and through global politics, providing an original, unexpected perspective on war and power, especially as far as the US policy is concerned. 

It is also a warning aimed at those who pursue their own interests instead of the national ones, sometimes scattered with maddening inconsistencies, and an encouragement for all those who fall prey to despair at the thought that dedicated leaders, with a sense of duty and love for the country and the people they serve no longer exist.

The memoirs describe, on one hand, a patrician-statesman, maybe the last of his kind, driven by a noble inclination towards public service, and, on the other hand, an intelligence officer with a brilliant career. 

He started as a junior analyst, he was promoted CIA director and he influenced his country's politics as a state secretary, having developed the power to express and impose his point of view in discussions discretely. Underneath the diplomat bipartisan healer with mild manners that everyone saw, the book reveals a volcanic temper, tormented by contempt, fed up with the reality he was facing and even bored.

While many must have envied Gates for his position and his power, his book seems aimed at dissuading politicians from ever trying to include him in their administration. Besides his obvious contempt and protestation towards the American political class, he confesses that he did not enjoy his political statute (“I did not enjoy being secretary of defense” – Gates, 2014, pp.197) and is convinced that people had no idea how much he detested his job (“People have no idea how much I detest this job” - pp.199).

Maybe the most important part of Duty is the author's criticism of the two presidents. As far as George W. Bush’s is concerned, his policies are severely criticized, but his personality, not so much. The president's agenda on freedom is deemed simplistic, and his goals regarding the war in Afghanistan are labeled as “embarrassingly ambitious" (pp. 427), given the poor and delayed results in training the Afghan troops. 

The Iraq invasion and the Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib rendition revelations are believed to have fueled the anti-American feeling even further (pp. 117). Gates declares himself “stunned” by the way Bush's administration bungled in the beginning years of the war and occupation in Iraq (pp. 26).

As far as Obama is concerned, Gates’ criticism is not that clear-cut. The black president is described as “quite pragmatic on national security” (pp. 226) and more deliberative than Bush, reminding of Lincoln's problem solving skills (pp.227). He is praised for his courage to go against Bin Laden. 

However, his administration is described as "centralized and controlling", comparable to those of Richard Nixon and of Henry Kissinger (pp. 439). Maybe the most interesting observation regarding Barack Obama is his lack of trust in his commanders, especially in Karzai, shared by Gates himself: “We at Defense …contributed to White House suspicions” (pp. 358).

The two presidents seem to have a lot in common as well, more than Gates had believed (pp. 441): they felt more comfortable around friends and close aides and friends, they tried to establish a network of supporters, allies and friends, they were neither feared nor liked, they reached out to those in need, especially to the families of the wounded and dead military, and they detested Congress.

In fact, Gates' own despise for Congress is one of the reason why Republican legislators rejected his work. He writes that Congress should be contemplated from a distance, as it is truly ugly from up close (pp. 435). The parochialism and political bullshit of most legislators outrage him, and the Foreign Affairs Committee members are “rude, nasty, and stupid” (pp. 79). He also ridicules Joe Biden, the Vice President, and some NSC younger staff members who challenged the generals' wisdom, but ends by agreeing that they were right. 

Gates' problem with Biden is the latter's influence on Obama in winding down the war faster, although, as he himself acknowledges, the president sided with him on almost all occasions. The author actually approves of Obama's announcement of the 33,000 extra troops surge and of the withdrawal starting in 18 months' time and praises the president for his courage in making "a decision that was opposed by his political advisers" (pp. 441).

Gates' relation with Obama was compromised in the spring of 2011, when, with the approaching midterm elections and under the fiscal pressures, the defense secretary was asked to reduce the budget with $400 billion within the upcoming 10 years. 

He stepped down three months later, after previously announcing his intentions. Looking back at his career under Obama's administration, the author acknowledges that he liked most of those he worked with and he was treated even better than during the previous administration. 

He even wonders: “Why did I feel I was constantly at war with everybody?” (pp. 425), and the only answer that comes to his mind is that it was all due to the fact that doing anything notable was so difficult.

It is important to note that Gates managed to surpass all those difficulties, and he had many notable accomplishments. In the beginning of Obama’s mandate, his budget ended or severely cut tens of major weapons programs and he convinced the Congress to approve his decision. He turned the Pentagon bureaucracy into a more responsive, accountable outfit. 

By upending the promotion board of the Army, he allowed some creative colonels take their careers to the next level and be advanced generals, and he fought for the troops as well. Some might not find themselves in his love recitations for the troops, in his teary recollections of hospital visits or condolence letters, but it all points that his emotions were genuine.

He obtained a supplement of $16 billion to the defense budget and ensured the construction and sending to Iraq of thousands of heavily armored MRAP troop-carriers, despite the service chiefs' objections, thus saving the lives of thousands of soldiers and Marine officers. 

After reading of Walter Reed hospital horrors, he did not hesitate to fire the army secretary and clean up the mess, and he fired the general who was the chief of the Air Force staff for delaying the production and delivery of the reconnaissance drones meant to help the soldiers identify roadside bombs and the insurgents planting them.

Despite his complaint that getting things done was difficult, Robert Gates succeeded in becoming maybe the most influential member of Bush and Obama's administrations. It is true, in his last couple of months as a part of Obama's administration, he lost the battle for the defense budget and the one regarding the involvement of the American military forces in the Libyan revolt. 

As he himself admits, although he enjoyed a tough but successful run for four years, the final months turned out differently (pp. 414). After getting used to win political wars, the shock of losing a few battles darkened his memories regarding earlier tensions and conflicts, won or otherwise.

Perhaps he began laying his memories on paper too soon after leaving the political scene, without giving his bitterness the chance to wear off. It may have been helpful to wait for a couple more years and gather his thoughts, put some order into them. 

There are several passages that justify this conclusion. For example, upon describing NSC's meeting to discuss the strategy to adopt in case Iran is attacked by Israel, Gates relates that the president's way of closing the meeting put him off. 

The president told his closest advisers to keep in mind that he did not make any decision regarding the two countries, in case they were going to write their memoirs, and this idea was offending for the state secretary (296). However, only a couple of years later, he did just that, and recounted the very same sensitive manners.

However, leaving such small details aside, the memoirs are compelling and of an undeniable historical value. One cannot deny the consistency and relevancy of chapters like those covering the statesman's meetings with various foreign leaders, with Dimitri Medvedev, Vladimir Putin and Benjamin Netanyahu among the most important and controversial. 

The author also portrays the Arab uprising internal debates and offers an inside perspective on what was going on at the White House throughout that period. Thus, we learn that Obama made his entrance at the White House with some of the worst cards he could have hoped for, worse than those that other modern era presidents had been dealt. 

We also discover that, despite the general, worldwide shared opinion that America holds the cards on almost everything going on around the world, the country's government has a severely limited ability to control events. America's national and international policy is maybe for the first time laid out and explained to the common people and thrown in the face of some politicians in a way that took everyone by surprise.  

Overall, with its small faults and gaps, common, probably, to all works of this kind, sustained by relevant and captivating real life photos that allow the reader to feel closer to the events and the author, Robert Gates' book offers a subjective but fair, consistent and enlightening perspective of the White House mechanisms. 

Sensitive information is laid out in an easy to read, interesting manner, in a convincing and seemingly honest tone, as one would remember them talking with a friend by the fire, in a cold winter night. Some of it is supported by strong arguments and evidence (facts confirmed by the media, official documents, following events, photos), while some is left to the reader's judgment. 

Accurate or distorted, well supported or merely stated,  all of this information put together already made and will continue to make an interesting reading for thousands of people around the world. While the average readers will find it captivating, the political class is sure to react to it in various manners (it already has). 

Some will admire and congratulate Gates for keeping his spine along the years he spent under the two different administrations and for his courage of coming out and laying his story out in the open. 

Others will envy him for being able to let out his anger and frustration and take attitude against events and actions they condemned themselves, but never dared do anything about. 

Finally, some will condemn him and accuse him of falseness and subjectivism, will try to defame him and deny his merits. 

Even so, the simple ability to stir so many and varied reactions speak highly of Robert Gates' influence and talent at captivating a wide audience and making his voice heard.

References

Gates, R. (2014). Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Available from http://tokhi.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Gates_Robert_M-Duty__Memoirs_of_a_Secretary_at_War.pdf